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Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of the presence of different social groups in society on pricesetting behavior of a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm. We use social (sub)group as the encompassing term for both social classes and social clusters. Social classes or subcultures are groups of individuals who are close according to some measure of social distance, like e.g. income, age or educational level, like for example yuppies or the population of students. Social clusters -which may alternatively be called cliques or peer groups -are groups of individuals with a high degree of personal interrelationships, like for example children in the same class. 1 Authors like Akerlof have stressed the importance of social groups in individual decision making, calling "the potential existence of (...) subgroups in the population with their own norms and values (...) one of the most important consequences of social interaction theory." (Akerlof 1997 (Akerlof , p. 1010 Within a group, there may be strong incentives to mimic the consumption behavior of the other members. This * Soetevent thanks the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support. Part of this paper was written while Soetevent was a visitor at the University of Wisconsin, whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges. Marco Haan, Saltuk Ozerturk, Jan Tuinstra and two anonymous referees have provided valuable suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
may be caused by social reasons (conformity), technological reasons (network effects), or by reasons of information dissemination. To give an example, consider a teenager thinking about buying a cell phone. The utility he derives from owning a cell phone is likely to increase with the relative number of members in his social subgroup that own a cell phone, for mere reasons of communication or because his peers will possibly ostracize him if he refuses to buy a cell phone. 2 We refer to these positive consumption externalities that are contingent on an individual's subgroup as local externalities. They have to be contrasted with the externalities that are commonly studied in the network literature. These are of a global nature in the sense that they work through the number of individuals in society as a whole that owns the good. The correspondence between network models and social interaction models that is often observed in the literature 3 holds as long as society is considered as one large social group, but changes character when society is partitioned into different groups.
Since local externalities are dependent on the social groups within society, changes in the composition of these groups can lead to changes in equilibrium pricing decisions. In this paper, we develop a simple, two-stage model with a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm 4 to analyze a market with local consumption externalities. In the first stage, the firm sets a (uniform) price for its good and in the second stage, consumers decide whether or not they buy this good. Due to social interactions, the purchase decision of a consumer is positively dependent on the fraction of consumers in his or her group who buy the good. We analyze the consequences of the presence of different social groups by comparing a benchmark case without different subgroups with the situation in which society is partitioned into two non-overlapping social groups. The price set by the monopolist and its profit are dependent on the strength of the consumption externality and on the specific groups that are formed. Interestingly, the presence of different smaller groups does not automatically increase the profit of the monopolist. For some configurations, it lowers the price and incurs a loss as compared to the benchmark case. In practice, changes to social groups can occur exogenously, as a result of societal or policy changes. 5 For example, the tendency to decrease class size can be viewed as a development toward smaller social groups, when one takes the position that a pupil's class is a good proxy for his social group. 6 In this paper, we focus on these exogenous changes in social groups.
2 Ormerod (1998, p. 23) describes how the dissemination of information affects consumption decisions within social groups: "If a friend or neighbour buys a VHS machine and is satisfied, you are more likely to do the same." 3 For example, Grilo/Shy/Tbisse (2001, p. 387) note with respect to the externality caused by network goods: "Though the reasons for this externality are technological rather than social, the corresponding models lead to reduced forms that can be used to study the market impact of the social phenomena described above." 4 For simplicity, we focus on the monopolistic case, but the main message -profit-maximizing firms should react to the presence of different social groups in society -is equally valid in other market environments. 5 Clearly, the monopolist may (besides changing its price) also react to the presence of different groups by means of advertising campaigns that are aimed at influencing an individual's perception of the fraction of members in his or her group that buy the product. A real-life example is the Vodafone 'How are you?'-campaign. To teenagers, Vodafone tries to point out that a large fraction of other teenagers in their subgroup own a cell phone by depicting young people having fun at a pop concert. In the same commercial, the company conveys a similar message to business men, by showing people gathered in an office for an important meeting. However, the monopolist's advertisement decisions are not explicitly modeled in our current model.
In studies on network effects, positive consumption externalities give rise to the analysis of compatibility decisions -should firms opt for manufacturing compatible or incompatible products (Farrell/Saloner 1985 , Katz/Shapiro 1985 , Ellison/Fudenberg 2000 , Baake/Boom 2001 -and to the issue whether producers should engage in introductory pricing to attract a critical mass of consumers (Cabral/Salant/Woroch 1999) . We want to stress that one cannot simply interpret the partition of society into smaller social groups as some kind of 'reversed compatibility'. When compatibility is made undone, the absolute number of people in an individual's network unambiguously decreases. However, in our model, the key determinant is the fraction of individuals within a group that owns and uses the good. It turns out that this fraction may as well go up as down due to the partition. Furthermore, in our model the separation between groups is not determined by product heterogeneity but by exogenous individual characteristics. In the next section, the model is introduced. In Section 3, equilibrium demand, price and profit are derived for a society without subgroups, and in Section 4, the same is done for a society segmented into two non-overlapping social groups. Section 5 investigates under which conditions the presence of the two groups increases or decreases the monopolist's equilibrium profit. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
Consider a market on which a monopolistic firm supplies one good to a continuum of consumers with mass equal to 1. This continuum is segmented into J > 1 social groups. The market is modeled as a two-stage game. In stage 1 the monopolist determines the price p of the good. We assume that the firm is not able to charge different prices to the different groups. Given p, the consumers determine their demand for the good in stage 2. Every consumer buys either one unit of the good or none at all. Within a subgroup, consumers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic utility for the product, but homogeneous with respect to the consumption externality. The utility of a consumer in group /, / e {1,2 /}, is given by:
, [ tp + vXj -p if the consumer buys the product; ...
U(4>,kj,p)
= jQ otherwise.
(1)
Here <t> denotes the intrinsic utility of the consumer for the product, with <p uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 0] . Without loss of generality we take 0 = 1. Social groups are formed by partitioning the population according to the intrinsic utility <t>. \j is the fraction of consumers in social group j that actually buys the product, with j e {1,2,...,/}. The parameter y > 0 incorporates the strength of the externality within a group. We assume that the externality y is equally pervasive in all groups.
It is important to note that Ay represents the fraction of the agents in subgroup j consuming the good, not the absolute size of the local social network: other things equal, this means that the consumption externality is stronger if 2 out of 3 peers consume the good (Ay 0.67), than if 4 out of 10 peers consume the good (Ay = 0.40), even though the absolute size of the local social network is larger in the latter instance. For example, in our mobile phone example it is easy to imagine that a consumer has a larger propensity to buy a mobile phone when he can use it to communicate with 2 out of his 3 peers than when only 4 of his 10 peers can be reached.
We will derive the equilibrium of the model by using backward induction, i.e. we first analyze stage 2 and next stage 1. Starting with stage 2, let the price p be given (but arbitrary). Following the literature, we assume that each consumer can correctly anticipate Ay, the fraction of consumers in his own group that, given p, actually will purchase the good (see e.g. Shy 2001, p. 20). Using this assumption we can determine the (Nash) equilibrium demand function Dip) of the total population for the good in stage 2, where (given p), simultaneously, in any group /'(/'= 1,...,/) each consumer determines whether or not he will purchase the good by maximizing his own utility, taking as given the purchase decisions of his peers in equilibrium. The function Dip) is found by aggregating the resulting individual demands across all consumers and groups. Next, in stage 1, the firm sets its price p so that profit is maximized, while taking into account total equilibrium demand Dip) in stage 2. To ease the exposition, the marginal costs of the firm are normalized to zero. Thus, the firm's decision problem is to maximize n = D(p)p.
Before entering upon the consequences of the presence of different subgroups, we will first analyze the outcomes when society is not segmented, that is / = 1. This analysis will serve as a benchmark for the results obtained in subsequent sections.
The unsegmented society
We assume from now on that y < 1; that is, for the consumer with the highest valuation the effect of the consumption externality is always smaller than his intrinsic; utility for the good. For larger values of y, the conformity effect predominates, which results in rather trivial equilibria in which everyone buys the good.
Consumers' equilibrium demand
When the total population is not split into subgroups, there can be three types of (equilibrium) demand in stage 2, depending on the price p: one where none of the consumers buys; one where a fraction of consumers buys; and one where all consumers buy the good. In equilibria where only a fraction of consumers buys, we have that if some consumer with an intrinsic utility level <j > decides to purchase the good, then all consumers with a larger intrinsic utility level purchase the good as well (since dU(/)/d(p > 0 in that case). For this case, let <p denote the intrinsic utility of the marginal consumer who is just indifferent between buying or not buying. The consumers that buy the good are those with 0 e [0,1]. Note that we assume that the marginal consumer purchases the good as well. Solving the indifference condition for this marginal consumer, we obtain:
Notice that (2) assumes that the indifferent consumer correctly anticipates the fraction (1 -0) of consumers that purchases the good in the equilibrium. Equation (2) implies that 4> 5 1 O-P < 1 and 0 < <p p > y, and the following property is obtained:
Thus, demand is complete (the mass of consumers who buy the good is equal to zero) if the price is relatively small, demand is zero if the price is relatively large, and demand is incomplete (the mass of consumers who buy the good is between zero and unity) if the size of the price is in between.
Firm's pricing decision
Turning to stage 1, we derive the pricing behavior of the monopolist, given any y. First,
It then easily follows that profit is maximized if the price equals p° = j, giving a profit of TT° = n(p°) = 1/(4(1 -y)). Note that demand only takes on this form when y < p < 1. Verifying this condition when p° = j leads to the restriction that y < j. If y > j, all consumers want to buy the product as long as p < y, leading to the optimal price p° = y with corresponding profit n® = n(p®) -y. The results are summarized below.
Property 2 The profit-maximizing equilibrium price p (i and corresponding profit 7T° = 7t(p°) are:
The result shows that when the conformity effect is relatively weak (y < j), the equilibrium price is unaffected by y, but profit increases in y, due to the fact that the demand increases if the conformity effect becomes stronger. When the propensity to conform is sufficiently strong (y > j), the monopolist will always capture the entire market in equilibrium. In that case, profit increases with y, through the increase in price.
A society with subgroups
In this section, the consequences of social groups on equilibrium demand, price and profit are analyzed. For simplicity we focus on the case with two social groups (J -2). The segmentation is implemented by splitting the population into two groups according to the intrinsic utility of the consumers. Consumers with the lower intrinsic utility <t> e [0, <p s ) are assigned to group 1 and consumers with the higher intrinsic utility tj> e [4> s , 1] are assigned to group 2. We assume that <t > s is exogenously given, with 0 < <f> s < 1. One can interpret the segmentation process literally as sorting individuals according to their intrinsic utility. In differentiating between youth and business men, Vodafone possibly indirectly distinguishes between two groups with different intrinsic utilities for mobile phones, as it might be that the intrinsic utility that business men derive from a mobile phone is higher or lower than the intrinsic utility youth derives from the same product. 
Consumers'equilibrium demand
The utility of the consumers in group 1 and 2 is still described by (1), with / = 1 and 2, respectively. The (equilibrium) demand function for each of the groups is derived in a similar fashion as the demand function for the total population in the previous section. Again, in equilibria where only a fraction of the consumers buys, they must group according to their type, such that = (<p s -4>\)l<j>s and X-2 = (1 -<fc)/( 1 ~ <t>s), where 4>\ and 02 denote the intrinsic utility of the marginal consumers in group 1 and 2, respectively, that are indifferent between buying and not buying. Solving the indifference conditions for these marginal consumers leads, respectively, to
and h + = W, <4,
Using the expressions for <j>\ and (j>2-> one can easily derive total equilibrium demand Dip) = D\(p) + Dxip), whenever y < min(0 s , 1 -<p s ). See also Figure 1 (in which domain A is further divided into subdomains A-[ to Ag, as discussed below). In domain A the conformity effect is below average, y < j, while in domain D this effect is above average. Products for which a conformity effect is especially important are situated in the latter domain. Domain B is situated in the area for which the intrinsic utility parameter is above average, <p s > \ -This means that a small group 2 with a higher than average intrinsic utility comes into existence. For example, the shift of children from (very) wealthy families toward private schools is modeled best with parameter values (y, <ps) in this domain. In domain C the split takes places in the lower part of the intrinsic utility range, resulting in a small group 1. In this case, one can think of situations where firms introduce a new product by means of an advertisement campaign that is directed toward a broad group of quite interested potential buyers (group 2). The small fraction of the population that has scarcely interest in the good (group 1) is not considered a target by the marketeers of the firm.
We can easily find for each of the four domains the equilibrium demand for groups 1 and 2, which by aggregating yields the following characterization of total equilibrium demand (see the proof in the Appendix).
Property 3 Imposing Assumption 1, in stage 2 total equilibrium demand Dip) is described by: Property 3 states (total equilibrium) demand in stage 2 for all relevant price intervals and all combinations of parameter values (y, <t>s). Observe that only the following five types of demand may occur: (a) demand is complete in both groups; (b) demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group 2; (c) demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2; (d) demand is zero in group 1 and incomplete in group 2; (e) demand is zero in both groups. In particular, it is not possible that demand is incomplete in both groups.
The monopolist's pricing decision
Now, we will derive the profit-maximizing equilibrium price and corresponding profit of the firm, given any combination (y,<ps)-To this purpose, a separate analysis is performed for each of the four domains A till D. The proof of our result is discussed in the Appendix; here we only give a brief outline of our procedure. For example for domain A, the optimal price is calculated in the following way. As a first step, we calculate the optimal prices p*A,..., p*A and corresponding profits (nip*.),..., Trip*.)) for all price intervals (¿A) up to (vA) mentioned in Property 3, under the restriction that this price indeed is in the given interval. As a second step, the maximum profits in the five price intervals are compared for any given combination (y, 4>s)-The price p* that given (y, <ps) globally maximizes profit is obtained as:
and the corresponding profit is n* -n (p*). We introduce two threshold values for y: It appears that, depending on the values of y and <ps, in equilibrium there are four possible expressions for the optimal price and corresponding profit. We introduce the following notation for these four combinations: 
n IV = y.
4<t>s(4>s -y)
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Now we are able to present the following property (see the proof in the Appendix). 
Here y is defined in (6) In order to understand Property 4 in an intuitive way, let A. * and k J 2 denote the fractions of consumers that buy in equilibrium in, respectively, group 1 and group 2, when the optimal profit equals it 1 . In a similar way, we define Xj and k 2 , etcetera. It follows from the proof of Property 4 that k[ = 0, 0 < k
We now observe that the area where n 1 is maximal is in the lower left corner of Figure 1 (i.e. the area below the line ¿3) where both the social conformity effect y is relatively small and the value fa at which the population is split is small. The latter implies that group 1 is relatively small here, whereas group 2 is relatively large. We notice that in this case only a fraction of the consumers in group 2 (those with the higher intrinsic utility) buys and nobody in group 1. Intuitively, a higher y helps the firm to win consumers for his product. Since in the lower left corner, both the intrinsic utility of the consumers in group 1 (and, thus, the size of this group) and the value of y are low, it is not profitable for the firm to lower prices to induce individuals in group 1 to buy. Moreover, the low value of y also prohibits the firm from selling to all members of group 2. At points at the line <¿3, all individuals in group 2 buy, even the person with the lowest intrinsic utility 4> s . The message this line contains is that it is profitable for the firm to sell to the person with lowest intrinsic utility fa in group 2, even as (starting from a point on ¿3) the value of fa decreases, as long as this decrease is compensated by an accompanying increase in the conformity effect y. Notice that due to this increase in the conformity effect, the firm does not have to decrease prices to induce the marginal group 2 member to buy (on ¿3 the equilibrium price always equals j).
In the middle part of Figure 1 (i.e. the area bounded by ¿3, the curve y\ -yx, <¿4 and the horizontal axis), 71 IS optimal. In this case the equilibrium price is such that the monopolist captures all members of group 2 as customers and none of group 1: the segmentation of the population into buyers and non-buyers coincides with the segmentation into peer groups. Again, the low intrinsic utility of the potential buyers in group 1 makes it unattractive for the firm to sell to them. However, the value of y is high enough to win all members of group 2 for the product. In the next section, we discuss that in this area, given <j>s, a stronger conformity effect leads to strongly increased prices. However, once the border <¿4 is crossed, it pays to decrease prices sharply in order to induce all individuals in group 1 to buy the product too. On the line ¿4,
In the upper left corner of Figure 1 (i.e. the area above the curve y\ -yi and to the left of ¿2)» value <ps is relatively high, which means that group 1 is relatively large and group 2 is relatively small. Moreover, the conformity effect is modest. In this area n ,!I is optimal, and all members of group 2 as well as some individuals of group 1 (those with the higher intrinsic utility) buy. In the next section we argue that the firm makes some price concessions to induce consumers in group 1 to buy the product. If we cross the curve y\ -yi in upward direction, consumers in group 1 with the highest values of the intrinsic utility parameter are starting to buy the good. On d% in Figure 1 all members of group 1 buy, even the person with intrinsic utility equal to zero. If, starting from a point on d2, the size of <j>s increases, then the price will increase (see p ). The individual of group 1 with intrinsic utility equal to zero is just induced to buy if this increase in price is compensated by an accompanying increase in the conformity effect y.
Finally, in the (upper) right part of Figure 1 (i.e. above ¿4 and to the right of d2), n IV is optimal. In this area all individuals in society will buy in equilibrium, because in this case, the strength of the conformity effect prevails over the individual intrinsic utilities.
Effects of social subgroups on prices and profits
Properties 2 and 4 provide the equilibrium price and profit for the situation with one or two social groups, respectively. Using these two properties, we now compare the equilibrium prices and profits that are obtained before and after the formation of subgroups. It is natural to think that splitting a population into smaller groups might increase for the firm the possibilities to use the conformity effect to its advantage, since the fraction of consumers that purchase the good might easily be higher within smaller groups. Property 5 shows that this is only partially true. The property gives the exact combinations of y and 4>s for which equilibrium profit is increased due to the presence of different social groups (see the proof in the Appendix).
Property 5 Imposing Assumption 1, let n® be the equilibrium profit with one social group and n* be the equilibrium profit with two social groups. We then have: Using Property 5, one can see that in the lower left part of Figure 1 (i.e. the area below the curve -y4 and ¿4), profit is highest with two groups; in the upper left corner of this figure (i.e. the area above the curve yj -y4 and to the left of y = 1/2), profit is highest with one group; and in the upper right part of this figure (i.e. the area above ¿4 and to the right of y = 1/2), profit is the same under one and two groups. Intuitively speaking, the reason of the lower profit in case of two groups in the upper left corner of Figure 1 is that in this area, both group 2 is relatively small and consumers in group 1 with the highest intrinsic utilities have relatively high values of <f>. Thus, the firm is eager to sell to at least some individuals in group 1. However, these individuals are not motivated by the buyers with higher intrinsic utility who belong to group 2. A price reduction is needed to induce them to buy (numerical calculations show a maximal price reduction of 23%). However, the increase in demand that results is not sufficient to prohibit the monopolist from suffering a loss due to the presence of two groups (there is a maximal loss of about 8%, approximately when (y, 0 S )=(O.3, 0.66)). In the same vein, the intuitive reason of the higher profit in case of two groups in the lower left part of Figure 1 is that in that area group 2 (the group of consumers with a high intrinsic utility) is relatively large. As a result there is a strong increase in price as the firm now only focuses on group 2, which in turn induces an increase in profit (numerical calculations show a maximum profit increase of about 18%, reached at point (y, <p s )=(l/3, 1/3)). Further, in the lower left part of Figure 1 , given a value of <p s , prices increase sharply as the conformity effect becomes more pervasive (to a maximum increase of 100%). However, when the line J4 is crossed, prices fall again to the same values as in the case without peer group segmentation. The reason is that then it is more profitable to capture the entire market instead of only group 2, and we enter the area where profit is the same under one and two groups. 8 In order to attract the group 1 consumers, the monopolist has to reduce prices.
Remark 1: Proposition 5 shows that in a market with local social interactions, splitting the population might lead to higher or lower profit for the firm. Observe that splitting induces a change in individual demand through a change in the utility function (1), the value of which is dependent on the subgroup to which an agent belongs and the fraction of agents in the subgroup who consume the good (A.y). As a consequence, aggregate demand Ds(P) = Di(p) + D 2 (p) in a segmented society in general differs from demand D\j(p) in an unsegmented society (i.e. when consumers constitute one group). In a standard market without social interactions (y = 0), the total demand function of both groups in the situation with segmentation is equal to the demand function corresponding to the situation without segmentation (Dj(p) = Djj(p)). This is because individual utility functions are not affected by the specific subgroups that are formed. It follows that in the standard model, the firm's optimal profit is the same in both situations. Notice that we assume here, similar as in our own model, that the firm is not able to charge different prices to the groups 1 and 2.
Remark 2: Suppose for the moment that our monopolist has control over <j> s , what would then be his best response BR(y) to an exogenously given value of y? The answer is that BR(y) = (1 -y)/2, a function that runs from point (0, 1/2) to (1, 0) in Figure 1 (not shown). All combinations of (y, BR(y)) are in the area with A.^ = 0 and Xif = 1. This means that, when given the opportunity, the monopolist picks <j> s in such a way that a perfect segmentation in buyers and non-buyers is obtained, irrespective of the value of y.
Conclusion
In this paper we explored the consequences of the presence of local consumption externalities, due to social groups within society, for the price-setting behavior of a profitmaximizing monopolist. The partition of society into small social groups does not inherently lead to increased market power of the monopolist. The sign and size of the change in prices and profits is dependent on both the strength of the conformity effect and the specific social groups that are formed.
When the conformity effect is high, equilibrium prices tend to be unaffected by the group formation. Low values of the conformity effect lead to a price decrease when group 2 is relatively small. In this case, the monopolist prefers not to face segmented consumers. When group 2 is relatively large, it is not attractive for the monopolist to sell to group 1 and for this reason equilibrium prices and profits increase sharply. The formation of social groups is done on basis of the intrinsic tastes for the good. Though this implementation has an interpretation as a segmentation on basis of income, it is somewhat stylized and for this reason should be seen as a first attempt to model the consequences of social groups on price setting. In this study, we only consider the case with two groups.
A natural future extension would be to consider the effects of partitioning society into partially overlapping groups. Another modification would be to explicitly model the ad-vertising decisions of the firm. A third possible extension is, as in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) , to allow for 'multiplicative preferences' under which the value that consumers attach to the local consumption externality is correlated with their intrinsic value for the good.
Appendix: Proofs
We give the proofs of Propositions 3, 4 and 5. To save space, we focus in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 on the details for domain A only. 9
Proof of Property 3
We derive total (equilibrium) demand D(p) = D^(p) _+D2(p) for domain A. We can use the expressions for the marginal consumers <j >\ and 02 given by (3) and (4), respectively, without restriction since y < min(</>s, 1 -<p s ) for this domain.
We first remark that fa < <j> s (p -y)/(<l>s -y) < 1 p < and
Using this, we obtain that, in case y < <p s , group l's demand equals:
Noting that fa ^ 1 & P 5 1 and <p s < fa O p > fa + Y, a similar analysis shows that, in case y < 1 -<p s , group 2's demand is:
Combining, we obtain the statements for domain A given in Property 3.
•
Proof of Property 4
Recall that in domain A, we have y < min(0s, 1 -tp s ). First, we consider the pricing behavior for each of the price intervals (iA) to (vA) indicated in Property 3.
(iA) p < y When the price is smaller than or equal to y, demand is complete in both groups and the optimal price the monopolist can choose without leaving the price interval is choosing the price equal to the upper bound of this interval. That is, p* A = y and 9 The analysis for domains B till D is similar, and available from the authors upon request.
• If P < y D^ip) = <t> s ; Remark that y < y as <p s > 0. Hence, for this price interval, one has to distinguish three cases with respect to the optimal price: Thus, when y > y, demand is complete in both groups; when y < y, demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2, and when y < y < y, demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group 2.
(¿¿¿A) 4> s < P < <t>s + Y When price is within this interval, demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2. As in (¿A) the optimal decision for the firm is to choose price equal to the upper bound of the price interval, which is <j> s + y in this case. (fA) p > 1 For prices larger than 1, demand is zero in both groups and profits are zero as well, n* A = n(p* A ) = 0.
After this derivation of the optimal price and the corresponding profit for each of the five price intervals, the second step of the procedure is carried out. In this step, the maximum profits in the five price intervals are compared given any combination of (y, <p s ) within domain A. The price p* is chosen that maximizes overall profit 7t(p\ y, 4> s ). Since for price interval (iiA) and (if A) there are three, respectively, two, subcases -dependent on whether y exceeds certain threshold values -domain A is divided into the six subdomains A\ to Ag introduced in section 4. For each of these subdomains maximum profits over the five different price intervals are compared, given a particular combination of (y, <t> s ).
That price is deemed optimal that maximizes overall profits. Thus, the optimal price and profit when (y, <p s ) is in subdomain A\ are given by p A^ = P* ivA b =<t>s + y and n* Ai = n* vAb = (1 -<p s )(A + y).
• ad Ax For A~i a similar evaluation gives See Figure 1 , where the roots y\ and yi of (A.l) are depicted. The figure shows that y\ and yx are relevant since they overlap with subdomain A3.
• ad A4 From the preceding, we know that
Thus, for (y,<t>s) in A4, the maximum profit is either n*iAb or n*vAa. Solving However, one can show that for each value of tj) s , the smaller root yy in (A.2) is larger than the corresponding value of y. In other words, both lines y = yy and y = yy are located at the right of line ¿2 in (/> <A$)-space.
Since n*h < n*^ when y ^ (yy, yy), the result is that p*A = p*vAa we have that p\s = p*v/{b = <ps + y and n\s = n*vAb = (1 -4>s)(<p5 + y).
• ad Ag In this case, we have 
Proof of Property 5
Property 2 shows that the equilibrium profit for the situation with a single group is 1 1 given by = if y < j, and 7r° = y if y > -. Property 4 shows that the equilibrium profit jt* in the situation with two peer groups is given by either or 71* = n™ = y. To ascertain whether the equilibrium profit is larger before or after the formation of peer groups, jt 0 is compared with 71* for all six relevant combinations. I • First, take the case where 7t° = and it * = . We observe that this com-4(1 -y) bination of values is relevant if 0 < y < j, in particular in the subdomains A\, A5, a part of A3, and a part of domain C (where j -<p s < y < j). For each of these areas, we apply the following procedure. First, we check whether jr° and JT 11 are not simply identical in the whole area under consideration. Second, if that is not the case, we infer for each possible value of <p s in the relevant area, for which values of y (if any) we have that it® = jt^. Note that in solving this equation, for the moment, we do not impose any condition on y. Next, we check whether the combinations of <j> s and y thus obtained are in the area under consideration. If this is the case, the area is divided into a part where having two peer groups leads to higher profit, and another part where one group is best for the firm. Otherwise, for the whole area, either having one group or having two peer groups leads to the highest equilibrium profit. Carrying out the procedure and solving 7r° = n !i for y, we obtain
In Figure 1 , the curve corresponding to the roots and 74 is depicted. Notice that the curve runs through the points (y,<p s ) = (0, j) and (y,<t> s ) = (j> j)-Further, observe that the second term on the right-hand side of (A.3) becomes zero for <p s = (-j ± jV5). Thus, in the areas under consideration, when <p s > (-j + j\/5), then 734 are imaginary and having two peer groups is always less profitable than having one peer group. On the other hand, when j < <j> s < (-j + having two peer groups is more profitable if y e (/3, 74) and less profitable if either 0 < y < 73 or < y < j.
• Second, proceeding in a similar way, take the case where n 0 = y and n* = n 11 . Notice that this combination of values is relevant in the part of domain C where y > j. In this case, the equation = n 11 is solved for y = 1 -<p s . However, this coincides with the border of the domains C and D (which itself is part of domain D). Combining this with our results above, we see that having two peer groups is more profitable than having one group for all points in domain C where n* = n 11 .
• Third, examine the case where 7r° = , and n* = k 111 . This combination of 4(1 -y) values is relevant if 0 < y < j, in particular in the remaining part of A3 and a part of We now first show that the smaller value, that is 75, is larger than or equal to y = (<f>s)/(<t>s + 1) (which is represented by ¿2 in Figure 1 ). In order to do so, observe that
( Concluding, in the whole area under consideration, having two peer groups always leads to a lower equilibrium profit compared with the situation in which there is one group.
• Fourth, compare ;r° = --with n* = n 1 . The area where these values are relevant 4(1 -y) is where 0 < y < j, and consists in particular of the subdomains A2, A4 and Ag, and a part of domain C (where 0 < y < \ -</> s )-In this case only y = 0 solves the equation . It is easy to verify that in the area under consideration having two peer groups always leads to a higher equilibrium profit than having one group.
• Fifth, compare jt° = , with 7r* = n ,v . The area where this combination of 4(1 -y) values is relevant is where 0 < y < j, in particular a part of domain B (where y < y < j ).
has a double root at y = j. For all other values of y, 7r° is larger than 7t IV , thus having two peer groups is less profitable than having one group in that case.
• Sixth, compare 7r° = y with n* = n Iv . The area where this combination of values is relevant consists of domain D as well as the part of domain B where y > j. In this case we always have JT° = TT ,v , thus having one or two peer groups leads to the same equilibrium profit.
Together, these six results imply Property 5. •
